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C. DUPRÉ, THE AGE OF DIGNITY (HART 2015)1 
 
Bob Dylan famously searched high and low for it and left us wondering ‘what it’s 
gonna take’ to find it.2 These days, the elusive dignity – and her equally, if not more, 
elusive cousin human dignity – has captured the imagination of not just the poet and 
philosopher, but also, in light of its increasing prominence in an array of legal contexts, 
the legal scholar.3 Catherine Dupré’s The Age of Dignity comes at a high point in 
(human) dignity scholarship, with the publication of numerous texts in the English 
language emerging on the subject,4 and with interest in it looking unlikely to dissipate 
any time soon. In this review, I consider (human) dignity’s promise and pitfalls as it 
transpires in Dupré’s wide-ranging and ambitious monograph.  
 
Dupré’s Dignity Narrative 
 
The Age of Dignity, subtitled Human Rights and Constitutionalism in Europe, embarks on 
the ambitious task of telling the story of human dignity’s development and 
transformative significance in European constitutionalism. Dupré proposes to take us 
on a journey through the archipelago of dignity,5 and on this cruise we encounter 
multiple facets and conceptions of dignity with Dupré our thoughtful, thought-
provoking and eloquent guide. Yet it is hard to shake the feeling, after reading the 
book, of having travelled across multifarious islands with Ithaca hardly in sight, to 
labour the metaphor. Whilst we might enjoy the beautiful journey,6 it bears 
consideration whether the dignity ‘compass’7 developed and lauded by Dupré is 
guiding us in any direction at all. I return to this issue with some critical reflections on 
the book after outlining some of its key threads. 
 
The investigation undertaken in this book takes us through multiple constitutional 
moments in which dignity – or human dignity – has been constitutionally enshrined, 
expounded, or adjudicated upon,8 with attention paid – inter alia – to the French 
Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen in 1789,9 the 
                                                          
1 Catherine Dupré, The Age of Dignity: Human Rights and Constitutionalism in Europe (Hart 2015); 
hereafter TAOD. 
2 Bob Dylan, ‘Dignity’ (Columbia Records 1991), cited in Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and 
Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 EJIL 655, at 655. 
3 See, for instance, McCrudden, ibid; Jeremy Waldron, ‘How Law Protects Dignity’ (2012) 71 Cambridge 
Law Journal 200; David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (CUP 2007). 
4 See, for instance, Aharon Barak, Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right 
(CUP 2015); Marcus Düwell, Jens Braarvig, Roger Brownsword and Dietmar Mieth (eds), The Cambridge 
Handbook of Human Dignity (CUP 2014); Christopher McCrudden (ed), Understanding Human Dignity 
(OUP 2013). 
5 TAOD, ch. 1. 
6 See Constanine P Cavafy, ‘Ithaca’ (translated by Daniel Mendelsohn). 
7 TAOD, 140, 165-170. 
8 TAOD, chapters 2-3. 
9 TAOD, 38-52. 
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establishment of the ILO in 1919,10 the West German Federal Republic’s ‘never again’ 
pledge of 1949,11 and subsequent codifications.12 Dupré offers manifold insights into 
the way (human) dignity has emerged as a legal concept across multiple European 
constitutional layers,13 and she does so synthesising and building on legal texts, case 
law and multi-disciplinary academic literature. In this process Dupré offers us 
fascinating glimpses into a range of non-Anglophone academic commentary on 
(human) dignity, which are crucial towards unfolding the multilateral academic and 
institutional conversations14 taking place on the substance, status and functions of the 
concept, particularly on the European continent. 
 
Dupré avowedly adopts a narrative ‘for’ human dignity in the context of European 
constitutionalism which is ‘not purely factual or historical, but is also driven by a spirit 
of theoretical and critical investigation into human dignity and European 
constitutionalism’.15 In Dupré’s account, constitutionalism is described as ‘a doctrine 
promoting constitutional means to foster democracy and to prevent abuses of 
sovereignty, at whichever level it may be exercised’.16 Dupré highlights the ‘rise of 
dignity’, measured through scholarly attention but also increasing legal – notably 
constitutional – codification and prolific use in both national and supranational case 
law.17 She refers to the codification of human dignity in Article 1 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) and Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
as the contemporary culmination of (human) dignity’s rise, at least in terms of 
European constitutionalism.18  
 
Importantly, however, Dupré raises the paradox of dignity as follows: ‘2009 can…be 
seen as a paradoxical stage in dignity’s development, whereby its normative status 
has never been so strong while its semantic status has never been less clear’.19 Against 
the sceptics who might portray human dignity as so vague and uncertain as to be 
useless, Dupré proposes that European constitutionalism offers definitions of (human) 
dignity: 
 
                                                          
10 TAOD, 49-50. 
11 TAOD, 58. 
12 TAOD, chapters 2-3. 
13 It focuses particularly on the EU and ECHR level, as well as certain national jurisdictions – TAOD, 
chapter 1. 
14 See, on this, McCrudden, ‘In Pursuit of Human Dignity: An Introduction to Current Debates’ in 
McCrudden, Understanding Human Dignity (n 4) 54-58. The collection edited by McCrudden is an 
eminent sample of such conversations. See also Düwell et al, The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity 
(n 4).  
15 TAOD, 13, citing Ted Honderich, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 638. 
16 TAOD, 7. 
17 TAOD, 1-4. 
18 TAOD, 82. 
19 TAOD, 3. 
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…a very strong normative definition (human dignity is inviolable), a very 
precise definition (as a constellation of absolute prohibitions well 
established in case law since the post-war years), and a very rich definition 
(as developed in the case law of Member States of the ECHR, and 
increasingly of the CJEU).20 
 
Thus, for Dupré, human dignity’s place in the European constitutional order(s) is 
cemented and affirmed as – or rendered – meaningful by the normative force of 
inviolability encompassed in Article 1 EUCFR (pace Articles 51 and 52 EUCFR); the 
‘core prohibitions’ such as those enshrined in Articles 2-4 ECHR and Chapter I 
EUCFR,21 proscribing inter alia unlawful killings, the infliction of torture and inhuman 
and degrading treatment and punishment, slavery and forced labour; and the rich and 
dynamic definitions offered by courts interpreting and applying human dignity or 
human dignity-based rights in a vast array of contexts.22 
 
The author traces a number of human dignity’s beneficiaries and functions. I can only 
distil them briefly here and cannot claim to do her narrative full justice. In her account, 
within European constitutionalism, human dignity pertains to ‘man’23 in accordance 
with ‘the threefold definition of humanity as biological being, as citizen and as 
worker’.24 This enables her to unpack a thread of human dignity which brings together 
rights such as those enshrined in Articles 2-4 of the ECHR, Chapter I and Article 31 of 
the EUCFR, Article 1 of Germany’s Grundgesetz, and many other provisions and 
instantiations of human dignity in legal texts and case law. Human dignity as 
codified,25 judge-made,26 and imagined,27 protects and empowers humanity, seen in 
both individual and relational form,28 in a dynamic and progressive manner. It 
protects freedom,29 autonomy,30 equality,31 and – it appears – certain labour rights;32 
as well as rights specifically concerning vulnerable persons such as the elderly,33 
including socio-economic rights.34 
 
                                                          
20 TAOD, 17. 
21 TAOD, 77. 
22 See TAOD, chapter 4. 
23 Dupré clarifies that this is not a gendered account of the human person: TAOD, 30, at fn 8. 
24 TAOD, 177. 
25 TAOD, chapters 2-3. 
26 TAOD, chapter 4. 
27 TAOD, chapters 6-7. 
28 TAOD, chapters 5-7. 
29 TAOD, 31-33. 
30 TAOD, 33-36 
31 TAOD, 37-38. 
32 TAOD, chapter 5. 
33 TAOD, 154. 
34 TAOD, 137, 139. 
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Additionally, Dupré builds a novel and elaborate account of human dignity as human 
time.35 In this account, human dignity signifies ‘time of one’s own’ (or Eigenzeit),36 a 
notion not only capturing individual self-determination but also encompassing the 
recognition of time-/context-specific vulnerability, the protection of the elderly and 
workers’ time through recognising time’s relativity and its value in non-economic 
terms and against the forces of ‘total capitalism’,37 and the safeguarding of a secularly 
sacred humanity38 across time.39 The idea of human dignity as human time also 
signifies human dignity’s ‘moment’, casting it as the kairos of human rights: a time of 
rupture and discontinuity, whereby a break is made with a tyrannical past and a 
constitution is built to mark the beginning of a new, democratic time, much like – as 
she sees it – in 1789, 1949 or 1989.40 On this account, human dignity is both memory 
and promise, a stark but also hopeful forget-me-not of past atrocity and tyranny;41 a 
rampart against inhumanity, war and dictatorship;42 and the promise of and tool for 
constant betterment and for the always unfinished, necessarily vigorous, process of 
democratisation.43  
 
The relationship between human dignity and European constitutionalism in Dupré’s 
account is symbiotic, attested by her assertion that, while Chapters 2-6 in the book use 
the framework of European constitutionalism to understand the actual and potential 
uses of human dignity, Chapter 7 adopts the converse approach of reflecting on 
human dignity’s theoretical significance for European constitutionalism.44 Human 
dignity embodies and takes forward Europe’s post-war commitment to humanity 
before, or over and above, the sovereign State;45 and putting humanity centre stage as 
the identity and purpose of European constitutionalism, human dignity pushes 
European constitutionalism towards a multi-layered46 and potentially highly 
                                                          
35 TAOD, chapter 6.  
36 TAOD, 151-156. 
37 TAOD, 195. See, on the ‘total market’, Alain Supiot, The Spirit of Philadelphia: Social Justice vs the Total 
Market (Saskia Brown tr, Verso 2012). 
38 TAOD, 177. 
39 TAOD, 151-156. 
40 TAOD, 156-160. 
41 TAOD, 58-61. 
42 TAOD, 177. 
43 TAOD, 184-185, citing Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (Princeton University Press 2006) 20-
21; and TAOD, 190. 
44 TAOD, 171. 
45 TAOD, 46-47. 
46 On multilevel constitutionalism, see, for instance, Ingolf Pernice, ‘Multilevel Cosntitutionalism in the 
European Union’ (2002) 27 European Law Review 511; Mattias Kumm ‘Who is the Final Arbiter of 
Constitutionality in Europe?: Three Conceptions of the Relationship between the German Federal 
Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice’ (1999) 36 Common Market Law Review 351. For 
a nuanced account on the enduring relevance of ‘sovereignties’ in Strasbourg (ECtHR) rather than 
Luxembourg (CJEU), see David Feldman, ‘Sovereignties in Strasbourg’ in Richard Rawlings, Peter 
Leyland and Alison L Young, Sovereignty and the Law: Domestic, European, and International Perspectives 
(OUP 2013). 
5 
 
judicialised model of humanist constitutional democracy: dignity-democracy.47 In this 
model of democracy, the (human) dignity-commitment is ‘interlocked’ in such a way 
that treaty- and constitution-makers at both national and supranational level are 
bound to comply with it in any constitutional revisions,48 a point whose predicate is 
human dignity’s ‘inviolability-eternity’ as Dupré sees it.49 On the dignity-democracy 
paradigm supported by Dupré, European constitutionalism must fend off ‘illiberal 
developments and systemic breaches of human rights’,50 perhaps through a militant 
commitment to its humanist dignitarian foundations.51 Vigilance is key, and human 
dignity is there to remind us of humanity’s and democracy’s fragility, and demand 
their protection. 
 
Thus, as I see it, (human) dignity in Dupré’s narrative is Janus-like:52 fostering 
transitions, doorways, new paths, and at the same time eternal, facing both backwards 
and ahead, possessing and shaping human time. But this is a secular deity,53 which is 
in turn possessed and shaped by humans, a res publica54 which can be moulded 
through ‘inclusive, transparent and democratic discussion, and through the 
procedural channels and fora of European constitutionalism’,55 resistant to 
ossification, ever-shifting. It embraces and safeguards a broadly construed humanity, 
which includes multiple identities of ‘man’, as well as future generations,56 a human 
family which is both empowered and, arguably, duty-bound to shape and protect its 
existence and its future.57 Human dignity as kairos is both eternal and subversive, and 
can be used to ward off evil and shape brighter futures, even through radical rifts with 
a rejected past, much like in some of the historical ‘moments’ identified by Dupré. 
 
Dupré’s account can offer food for thought to the theorist and comparatist of (human) 
dignity, as well as to the legal scholar. The book’s addition to Anglophone scholarship 
on human dignity should come to the attention of English public lawyers, who may 
wish to consider to what extent human dignity is ‘interlocked’ in the UK’s complex 
                                                          
47 TAOD, 182-193. 
48 TAOD, 189. On human dignity being ‘interlocked’ across Europe’s jurisdictions, see TAOD, 94-99. 
49 TAOD, 190. 
50 TAOD, 192. Dupré additionally makes some interesting remarks regarding constituent power and 
constituted power being blurred on the dignity-democracy paradigm, which merit further elaboration, 
particularly in terms of how they relate to crises (including crises of constitutionalism) – TAOD, 191. 
51 On constitutionalism and ‘militant democracy’, see, for instance, José Antonio-Santos, 
‘Constitutionalism, Resistance and Militant Democracy’ (2015) 28(3) Ratio Juris 392. 
52 Habermas identifies human dignity as Janus-faced in its moral and legal aspects – see Jürgen 
Habermas, ‘The Concept of Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights’ (2010) 41 Metaphilosophy 
464, 470. In Dupré’s account, however, I propose that dignity operates as Janus beyond the duality of 
its moral and legal aspects.  
53 Dupré repeatedly emphasises that her vision of human dignity is of a ‘secular concept’ – see TAOD, 
18-21, 170.  
54 TAOD, 21-23. 
55 TAOD, 170.  
56 TAOD, 178. 
57 On the power, and duty, to protect the time of mankind, see TAOD, 152. 
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and multi-layered constitutional system. This may become especially significant if 
changes in the UK’s human rights protection and/or if a significant rift in the UK’s 
relationship with the EU and/or the Council of Europe come about in the not-too-
distant future.58 
 
A disclaimer by the author: the project, according to Dupré, is ‘envisaged with the 
normal functioning of democracy and constitutionalism in mind’.59 This particular 
proviso raises numerous questions, particularly regarding what ‘normal’ connotes in 
relation to the functioning of democracy and constitutionalism given the contested 
character of both idea(l)s; but it appears to allude to circumstances which do not 
palpably amount to a ‘state of exception’ or crisis.60 This is evident from the author’s 
qualification of this disclaimer, whereby she suggests that she could not ignore the 
growing number of crises unfolding over the duration of the project, notably the Euro 
crisis, the adoption of the Hungarian Fundamental Law in 2010 and Iceland’s 
constitutional revision.61 The selection of those particular crises raises questions as to 
what has been selected and what has been omitted, and why; but I leave these 
particular questions to one side. More importantly, perhaps, it is worth contemplating 
whether this significant disclaimer is compatible with the monumental burden which 
(human) dignity bears, in Dupré’s narrative, in lifting us out of the gutters of indignity 
and inhumanity and into brighter futures. One wonders whether, in the context of 
crisis, including the present terrorism threat and the humanitarian plight of millions 
of asylum-seekers within – or on the fringes of – Europe, European constitutionalism’s 
lauded human dignity might, more or less, justifiably or not, shrug.62 
 
Conceptual Haziness, Tensions, and the Moral Vacuum: Critical Reflections 
 
There are certain aspects of this monograph which warrant critical reflection. I wish 
to briefly focus on three issues: namely, conceptual haziness; tensions and 
contradictions; and the absence of explicit engagement with human dignity’s moral 
character.  
 
Conceptual Haziness 
Dupré’s analysis sometimes tends – in my view – unduly to alternate between dignity 
and human dignity, although she is clearly aware of the significance which could be 
attributed to the distinction. Whilst dignity can be seen to connote rank or degree of 
(self-)worth or (self-)respect as exhibited or bestowed, in a way which might 
                                                          
58 For an examination of the importance of recognising human dignity as the foundation of human 
rights in the UK, see Benedict Douglas, ‘Undignified Rights: The Importance of a Basis in Dignity for 
the Possession of Human Rights in the United Kingdom’ [2015] Public Law 241. 
59 TAOD, 15. 
60 Much has been written on the state of exception, particularly in the context of counter-terrorism. See, 
for instance, Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Kevin Attell tr, University of Chicago Press 2005). 
61 TAOD, 15. 
62 Dupré is aware of this issue – she provides a measured but optimistic response in TAOD, chapter 8. 
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distinguish among human beings – so that human persons can be more or less 
dignified63 – human dignity is generally (though not unanimously) seen to encapsulate 
an equal moral status or intrinsic worth attributed to all human persons, which is 
elevated only in the sense of distinguishing all human persons from objects or non-
human animals.64 As such, human dignity demands a certain minimum respect and 
protection from desecration – as Dupré puts it – of one’s humanity.65 Thus, this 
alternating between dignity and human dignity within the book is important not just 
as a matter of style, but also as a matter of substance. There are points at which Dupré 
claims that an argument on human dignity has been made and references a statement 
mentioning only dignity, without the epithet human. Perhaps Dupré uses the term 
dignity (without the epithet human) to connote human dignity as just described. 
Nonetheless, I wonder whether her assertion of the dignity of citizens and the dignity 
of workers is always about human dignity, and if so whether it takes us down a 
problematic path whereby all human beings are equal in human dignity,66 but some 
are ‘more equal than others’. I return to this point below. 
 
A conceptual haziness also characterises how (human) dignity and its manifestations 
are described across the book. Without always clarifying or evaluating the significance 
of any distinction between these notions, (human) dignity is variously 
‘appropriated’,67 ‘breached’,68 ‘constructed’,69 ‘crafted’,70 ‘created’,71 ‘defined’,72 
‘deployed’,73 ‘derived’,74 ‘designed’,75 ‘developed’,76 ‘discovered’,77 ‘expressed’,78 
‘infringed’,79 ‘made’,80 ‘mapped’,81 ‘protected’,82 ‘shaped’,83 ‘translated’,84 
                                                          
63 Indeed, Tasioulas suggests that non-human animals may be said to have species-specific dignity: see 
John Tasioulas, ‘Human Dignity and the Foundations of Human Rights’ in McCrudden, Understanding 
Human Dignity (n 4) at 307. 
64 See Tasioulas, ; see also TAOD, at 35. 
65 TAOD, 60. 
66 On this premise, see Habermas (n 52); Jeremy Waldron, ‘Citizenship and Dignity’, in McCrudden, 
Understanding Human Dignity (n 4). 
67 TAOD, 86. 
68 TAOD, 103. 
69 TAOD, 21. 
70 TAOD, 86. 
71 TAOD, 88. 
72 TAOD, 132. 
73 TAOD, 99. 
74 TAOD, 87. 
75 TAOD, 22. 
76 TAOD, 86. 
77 TAOD, 87. 
78 TAOD, 18. 
79 TAOD, 111. 
80 TAOD, ch 4. 
81 TAOD, 13. 
82 TAOD, 21. 
83 TAOD, 103. 
84 TAOD, 94. 
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‘understood’,85 and ‘used’.86  It is variously described – inter alia – as a ‘concept’,87 
good’,88 ‘idea’,89 ‘principle’,90 ‘right’,91 ‘tool’,92 and – as mentioned - compass.93 I note 
this because it raises numerous questions, such as whether (human) dignity is 
something whose content is discovered or constructed, or whether its varied 
manifestations and functions can sensibly co-exist; and because, particularly insofar 
as human dignity is seen as a legal concept, these things matter.94 
 
Moreover, Dupré’s frequent reference to semantic status or meaning95 or definitions96 
elides the nuance necessary to appreciate that a concept’s specification97 involves its 
application in a (potentially infinite) array of circumstances, which can both bring our 
abstract understanding of it into sharper focus and reveal some of its heretofore 
unexplored or under-explored dimensions.98 Indeed, this is the way that her account 
of human dignity as pertaining to identified beneficiaries such as workers in particular 
circumstances and with particular implications can perhaps best be understood. At 
the same time, the definitions she offers in response to sceptics skate mostly on the 
surface of some of the controversies and tensions identified in specifying what human 
dignity demands in particular contexts – I return to this below. 
 
 
Tensions  
Relatedly to the conceptual haziness identified, Dupré often glosses over tensions in 
her dignity story. For instance, the marital rape case in the ECtHR may have involved 
vindicating the sexual autonomy of married women;99 but how did this square with 
the strict non-retroactivity principle encapsulated in Article 7 ECHR and its 
implications for the rule of law and human autonomy in the Europe of human 
                                                          
85 TAOD, 21. 
86 TAOD, 22. 
87 This is the case throughout TAOD. 
88 TAOD, 21. 
89 TAOD, 18. 
90 TAOD, 17. 
91 TAOD, 166. 
92 TAOD, 16. 
93 TAOD, 140, 165-170. 
94 On this, see McCrudden, ‘Introduction to Current Debates’ (n 14). 
95 TAOD, 3.  
96 See, for instance, TAOD, 17, and Chapter 6. 
97 Habermas, for example, considers human rights to be legal specifications of human dignity – see 
Habermas (n 52) 464. In turn, on the specification of rights, see, for instance, Russ Shafer-Landau, 
‘Specifying Absolute Rights’ (1995) 37 Arizona Law Review 209; John Oberdiek, ‘Specifying Rights out of 
Necessity’ (2008) 28 OJLS 127. 
98 This is only mentioned in passing and by reference to German academic commentary on Article 1 of 
the Grundgesetz at TAOD, 160. See, also, David Hollenbach, ‘Human Dignity: Experience and History, 
Practical Reason and Faith’ in McCrudden, Understanding Human Dignity (n 4).  
99 See SW v UK; CR v UK (1996) 21 EHRR 363. 
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dignity?100 Moreover, what is the ultimate connection between safeguarding the 
human dignity of unpopular, marginalised, and/or disenfranchised human persons 
and democracy, and which mechanism of protection ought to prevail in Dupré’s 
‘dignity-democracy’?101 Dupré’s suggestion that safeguarding human dignity will 
occur through ‘inclusive, transparent and democratic discussion, and through the 
procedural channels and fora of European constitutionalism, with...courts playing a 
key role’102 elides rather than resolves the institutional tensions which perennially 
plague these matters. Additionally, what is the relationship between safeguarding an 
abstract and inter-generational humanity and supporting self-determination, and can 
a freedom-/autonomy-focused human dignity capture it? Some of these issues or the 
tensions underpinning them have been repeatedly highlighted by dignity scholars,103 
and Dupré does not clearly respond to them. 
 
Another issue is that, whilst a promising and illuminating argument is made in 
relation to the Declaration of the Rights of Man being imbued with ‘the spirit of 
dignity as equality’ even whilst it uses the term ‘dignités’ to refer to official rank,104 the 
author does not build on this insight by exploring instantiations of human dignity in 
contexts in which express reference to (human) dignity may have been absent. If ‘the 
word [comes] after the substance’,105 and if human dignity’s significance within 
European constitutionalism lies in the substantive value(s) it embodies and protects, 
and not merely in offering a unifying language, then in telling the story of human 
dignity we should also be trying to find instances of its vindication even without its 
explicit mention.106 Otherwise, the story is skewed to reflect the linguistic use, rather 
than the substance, of human dignity in legal texts and judgments. Whilst Dupré 
claims to have captured the most momentous struggles in the rise of human dignity,107 
the story of the recognition of women’s humanity is palpably missing, for example.  
 
The substance versus rhetoric issue is broader. There is tension within the book 
between two perspectives on human dignity. On the one hand, human dignity 
embodies something substantive and meaningful, rich in content, as Dupré 
suggests;108 on the other, it often seems to amount simply to the way we (may wish 
                                                          
100 For Dupré, autonomy is a key aspect of human dignity: TAOD, 33-36; and the rule of law is a key 
aspect of constitutionalism: TAOD, 141.  
101 TAOD, 182-193. 
102 TAOD, 170. 
103 See, for instance, McCrudden (2008) (n 2) and (2013) (n 14). On autonomy and paternalism, for 
instance, see McCrudden (2008) at 705-706. 
104 TAOD, 40. 
105 TAOD, 43. Dupré also broadly attributes human dignity concerns to the ECHR, although there was 
no explicit mention of human dignity in it; she does so also in light of Strasbourg case law alluding to 
human dignity: see TAOD, 63-66. 
106 Matthias Mahlmann, ‘The Good Sense of Dignity: Six Antidotes to Dignity Fatigue in Ethics and 
Law’ in McCrudden, Understanding Human Dignity (n 4) at 595, citing Noam Chomsky, New Horizons in 
the Study of Language and Mind (CUP 2000) 147. 
107 TAOD, 51. 
108 TAOD, 17. 
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to) dress up or express our intentions as Europeans to be better and do better following 
spectacular moral failures, without agreeing on – or even properly contemplating, at 
least not en masse – why and how.109 If human dignity is more than just the latter – that 
is, more than a linguistic blank canvas on which people and institutions (might) 
project ‘best intentions’ from an array of political ideologies and visions of the good, 
following what is widely perceived to have been a spatially and temporally 
contextualised morally disastrous era – then a project which seeks to tell its story 
should be focusing more closely on conceptualising its substance and finding its 
proper instantiations.110 Although Dupré comes close to doing this in drawing 
connections between the Kantian theory of human dignity and the 1789 Declaration, 
Article 18 of the 1793 Declaration, and the ILO principles,111 she does not pursue it 
more holistically.  
 
The Moral Vacuum 
In my view, the tensions and contradictions outlined above are, to a large extent, 
symptomatic of a key aspect of Dupré’s study: the aversion to morality, which 
emerges in her assertion that ‘human dignity has nothing to do with morality, it is 
about human existence’, with reference to Kateb112 - but, in my view, without 
engaging with some of the nuances in Kateb’s thesis.113 Is human dignity, in Dupré’s 
account, a descriptor of a state of being, so that, indeed, many if not most of us are not 
born in dignity;114 a matter of semantic debate – to be resolved, perhaps, through a 
focus on popular usage; a matter of political contestation, representing victorious 
ideologies we can associate with it in different historical contexts; a positivist legal 
concept identifiable through pedigree-based legal method and ultimately traced 
down to social fact;115 a tool for the (legal) wordsmith, through which said wordsmith 
– perhaps a lawyer before the ECtHR – can promote his or her preferences?116 Or is it 
a moral concept, or morally imbued legal concept – perhaps an interpretive concept117 
– whose substance we are trying to capture?118   
                                                          
109 See Christopher McCrudden, ‘In Pursuit of Human Dignity: An Introduction to Current Debates’ in 
McCrudden, Understanding Human Dignity (n 4) at 2 (citations omitted): ‘The familiar story is that when 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was being drafted in 1948, the participants were able to 
agree on what they were against, but not on why they were against these violations.’ 
110 See Mahlmann (n 106) at 594-595. On conceptual interpretation, see Ronald Dworkin, Justice for 
Hedgehogs (Belknap Press 2011), chapter 8. 
111 See TAOD, 47-50. 
112 TAOD, 21, citing George Kateb, Human Dignity (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011) 
10-17.  
113 See, for instance, Kateb, ibid, at 13, 23. For more on Kateb, Human Dignity, ibid, see Bryan Pilkington, 
‘George Kateb, Human Dignity Book Review’ 66(2) The Review of Metaphysics 369. 
114 TAOD, Chapter 2. 
115 See, for instance, Jules Coleman, ‘Rules and Social Facts’ (1991) 14(3) Harvard Journal of Law & Public 
Policy 703. 
116 See the critical take on this in Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (CUP 2005). 
117 On interpretive concepts, see Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (n 110) 123, chapter 8. 
118 The idea of a heuristic concept which Dupré puts forward (see TAOD, 16-18) can accommodate this 
possibility. 
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That Dupré does not seem to take a clear evaluative stance beyond the selective 
narrative adopted entails that, while her perspective on the way human dignity’s 
content and significance has been shaped over time remains eminently positive and 
optimistic, she leaves underlying tensions largely unaddressed. This is tied to an issue 
hinted at above: Dupré’s identification and embrace of what is in effect a plurality – 
or archipelago119 – of meanings and functions of (human) dignity raises the question 
of whether she has appropriately responded to McCrudden’s critique of human 
dignity as being ‘a relatively empty shell’ which can countenance an array of 
competing and conflicting conceptions.120  
 
But there is a more problematic dimension to the dismissal of morality when talking 
about human dignity. A wishful perspective on human dignity’s malleability may 
present it as offering a tool for good – for progress, for democratic engagement with 
how to be/do better – and a platform for fruitful constitutional dialogues which reach 
all the way from Europe’s supranational institutions to Europe’s diverse demos and 
back again to shape ever-brighter futures. This, of course, leaves question marks as to 
the place in this enterprise of Europe’s human outsiders, whose deaths at the 
geographical and figurative fringes of Europe we are witnessing daily; and as to how 
to resolve relevant institutional tensions, which pose considerable and urgent 
challenges. Moreover, a bleaker outlook on human dignity’s malleability would warn 
us of the likely hegemonic capture of this concept through power-politics.121 This is 
no mere spectre; one can easily imagine the appropriation of workers’ ‘human’ dignity 
as put forward by Dupré to render fundamental socio-economic rights dependent on 
readiness to work on the terms of an increasingly brutal and brutalising neoliberal 
market.122 Ultimately, one could well argue that the hopeful but also self-
congratulatory tinge of the ‘never again’123 narrative and positive characterisation of 
Europe’s dignity developments would comfortably fit a critical account of alternating 
between apology and utopia.124  
 
                                                          
119 TAOD, 8. 
120 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation’ (n 2) at 698. 
121 See Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge 
2007) 8, 196. But see Tina Beattie, ‘The Vanishing Absolute and the Deconsecrated God: A Theological 
Reflection on Revelation, Law and Human Dignity’ in McCrudden, Understanding Human Dignity (n 4).  
122 Indeed, Shklar’s idea of the ‘dignity of work’ can be seen as potentially compatible with such 
development – see Judith Shklar, American Citizenship – The Quest for Inclusion (Harvard University 
Press 1995) 1, as cited in Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘Workers Without Rights as Citizens at the Margins’ 
(2013) 16 Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 366, 375, in turn cited at TAOD, 
136. In light of Dupré’s account of human dignity’s support for the elderly (see, for instance, TAOD, 
154), it is worth citing a European study on welfare, ageism and neoliberalism: Monika Wilińska and 
Elisabet Cedersund, ‘“Classic ageism” or “brutal economy”? Old age and older people in the Polish 
media’ (2010) 24 Journal of Aging Studies 335. 
123 See TAOD, 58-61, 121-122, 141-142. 
124 See Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology To Utopia (2nd edn, CUP 2006). Notably, however, Dupré 
denounces complacency: see TAOD, 198. 
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What, if any, is Dupré’s stance on the concrete prospect of a bleaker future? To take 
an example from the book, Dupré’s account of a pragmatic backtracking in ECtHR 
doctrine – based, presumably, on a self-preservation instinct vis-à-vis the UK’s vocal 
discontent – in Hutchinson v UK125 so as to dilute the human dignity-based demand 
for a clear prospect of release for whole life prisoners on the basis of Article 3 ECHR, 
is devoid of a prescriptive position.126 This is so despite her frequent praise for the 
progressive living instrument doctrine of the ECtHR,127 which underpinned the 
establishment of a ‘right to hope’ for whole life prisoners in Vinter v UK.128 This raises 
the question: is Dupré’s narrative a rosy account of the development of European 
constitutionalism,129 but ultimately amoral? There are certainly elements in Dupré’s 
human dignity narrative of evaluative judgement – in particular, of considering 
certain conceptions of human dignity to be better than others. Indeed, her support for 
evolutive interpretation (versus originalism)130 both embodies an evaluative stance 
and presupposes that there are morally sound and morally unsound accounts of 
human dignity and of the substantive scope of human rights.131 Otherwise, if, say, 
Dupré is only supporting interpretive shifts which merely diagnose and reflect 
popular societal changes,132 she must be prepared to have her high hopes of European 
society and ‘civilisation’133 crushed, and to countenance significant regressive 
developments in interpreting the demands of human dignity, for instance in how 
asylum-seekers or prisoners ought to be treated. If Dupré is not prepared to 
countenance this as part of her human dignity-constitutionalism story,134 her 
evaluative stance should be more transparent. For this – the ought element in her story 
– Dupré must embrace the moral dimension of her (human) dignity narrative, which 
she appears to renounce at the beginning of the monograph,135 but which strikes me 
as deeply embedded in her past-denouncing, future-embracing conception of human 
dignity as kairos. After all, if human dignity is meant to be the compass that guides us 
                                                          
125 Hutchinson v UK (2015) 61 E.H.R.R. 13. The case has been referred to the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber. 
126 TAOD, 164-165. 
127 See, for instance, TAOD, 184. 
128 Vinter and others v UK App nos 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10 (ECtHR, 9 July 2013). See the comment 
in Natasa Mavronicola, ‘Inhuman and Degrading Punishment, Dignity, and the Limits of Retribution’ 
(2014) 77(2) MLR 292. 
129 Pace the exploits of the EU’s FRONTEX agency, for example, outlined in Melanie Fink, ‘Frontex 
Working Arrangements: Legitimacy and Human Rights Concerns Regarding Technical Relationships’ 
(2012) 28 Utrecht Journal for International and European Law 20. 
130 TAOD, chapter 7. 
131 See, on this, George Letsas, ‘Strasbourg’s Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer’ 
(2010) 21 EJIL 509, 531. 
132 See TAOD, 188. 
133 The – perhaps disquieting – allusions to civility and civilisation in TAOD are multiple: see TAOD, 
78, 100, 125, 175, 196. 
134 Her aversion to a morally worse future is evident at many points in the book: see, for instance, TAOD, 
148-150.  
135 TAOD, 21, citing George Kateb, Human Dignity (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011) 
10-17. See John Tasioulas on deploying ‘moral reasoning’ in ‘Human Dignity and the Foundations of 
Human Rights’ in McCrudden, Understanding Human Dignity (n 4). 
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through what to hold onto (its eternal aspect) and what to break away from (its 
subversive aspect) then it surely has much to do with morality.136 
 
Lastly, I return to another issue hinted at earlier: questions may be raised about the 
human in the European human dignity – or dignities – which Dupré expounds. From 
a legal perspective, we may be prepared to accept that the contingent aspects of legal 
norms and institutions – including the very institution of the State, or the EU, as well 
as State sovereignty and jurisdiction – entail that not every human being on Earth can 
at any moment in time claim the benefits of Europe’s legal protection of human 
dignity. The moral defensibility of this reality is too vast a matter to discuss or 
problematize here – or to expect Dupré to tackle in this monograph. What particularly 
troubles me in Dupré’s account of human dignity, however, is that the substance given 
to it – rather than the structural barriers to enjoying this substance – may allow or even 
enable the reproduction of mechanisms of othering137 which attack the very core of 
human dignity: that is, the equally elevated moral status, or intrinsic worth, of all 
human persons above objects or non-human animals.138 For instance, whilst admittedly 
workers or citizens warrant human dignity’s protection qua human,139 Dupré is also 
suggesting that human persons attract particular human dignity protections qua 
workers and qua (EU) citizens.140 But while all citizens and workers might be human 
(as are all jobless, homeless, stateless, disabled, non-gender-conforming persons and 
countless other specifications or ‘categories’ of human persons), not all humans are 
workers or (EU) citizens. This raises the question of whether, within Dupré’s account 
of human dignity and European constitutionalism, some persons’ status as workers 
or EU citizens elevates or ought to elevate their human dignity and concomitant 
human rights above others’. Concretely, to give one example of the implications of 
this within Dupré’s narrative, suggesting that reading Article 4 EUCFR in conjunction 
with Article 3 ECHR can be a premise for a requirement of ‘decent remuneration’, 
which protects workers from destitution, raises the question: would other human 
persons not be entitled to such protection from destitution on the basis of human 
dignity? Could some be seen to be deservedly destitute?141 Additionally and more 
broadly, to return to a theme repeated across this review, if human dignity is viewed 
and constructed as a res publica142 through ‘democratic discussions’ premised on a 
constitutionalism which is humanist in both process and substance, who forms the 
                                                          
136 I contrast this with Dupré’s suggestion that human dignity has nothing to do with morality. See text 
to n 112 above. 
137 Consider, for instance, Weiler’s prophetic ‘Us and Them’ warning prior to the establishment of EU 
citizenship, in Joseph Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100(8) Yale Law Journal 2403, 2482. 
138 See, for instance, Mahlmann (n 106) 598; Tasioulas (n ??) at 305.  
139 TAOD, 126. 
140 For a nuanced account of the relationship between human dignity and the dignity of citizenship, see 
Jeremy Waldron, ‘Citizenship and Dignity’, in McCrudden, Understanding Human Dignity (n 4). 
141 See the critical comment on such a stance in Colm O’Cinneide, ‘A Modest Proposal: Destitution, State 
Responsibility and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2008) 5 EHRLR 583, 588. 
142 TAOD, 21-23. 
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demos who can possess and mould human dignity, who is and who ought to be 
excluded from it, and why?143 
 
Perhaps some of these concerns stem from Dupré’s narrative seeking to make human 
dignity do too much, or allowing it – within her narrative – acceptably to do and be 
such a variety of things that pervasive tensions and a lack of coherence become 
inevitable.144 Or perhaps a more morally coherent story is possible – and necessary.145 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Age of Dignity offers an array of ways of thinking about, interpreting, and shaping 
(human) dignity through time, illuminated with not only insight but also compassion, 
and with the aspiration of a humanist constitutionalism at its centre. Whether and 
insofar as we are fascinated, inspired, or troubled by the (human) dignity story or 
stories being told, I take Dupré’s book as calling on us to ‘heed the call’146 of human 
dignity, and to enter the conversation, to engage in the ongoing endeavour of 
determining the substantive contours of the minimum respect our common humanity 
requires. Of course our all too human147 grasp of how best to navigate this morally 
contested terrain is likely to be flawed; we must try our best nonetheless.148 Aiming to 
do and be better demands it. 
                                                          
143 Dupré recognises that certain human rights, notably the absolute rights found in the ECHR and 
EUCFR, protect ‘foreigners’ and other ‘voiceless minorities’ – see TAOD, 186; see also, on asylum-
seekers’ protection, TAOD, 110-111. Yet foreigners do not enjoy the full range of civil and political or 
socio-economic rights and benefits associated with EU citizenship. On human rights and the ‘other’, 
see William P Simmons, Human Rights Law and the Marginalized Other (CUP 2014). 
144 See McCrudden (2008) (n 2) at 723. 
145 Such a story could broadly follow Dworkin’s pursuit of integrity – see Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs 
(n 110), especially Chapters 1, 4, 6-9. 
146 Although a commonly used phrase, the plea to ‘heed the call’ is also a reference to Bob Dylan’s ‘The 
Times They Are A-Changin’’ (Columbia Records 1964), in which ‘the times’ could be read as 
embodying the idea of kairos outlined by Dupré – see TAOD, 157-160. 
147 See Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human (R J Hollingdale tr, CUP 1986).  
148 See Ronald Dworkin, ‘Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It’ (1996) 25(2) Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 87, 122, 139. 
